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BARRED EXCEPT FOR AN APPRAISAL AFTER CONSUMMATION

In re Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation,_-Pa.
Super. Ct._, 398 A.2d 186 (1979).
OF A MERGER.

In In re Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,' the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania held pursuant to sections 515 and 908 of the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law 2 that appraisal is a dissenting
shareholder's exclusive remedy subsequent to a corporate merger.
This case represents the first time that a Pennsylvania appellate court
has explained section 515K since its addition to the Business Corporation Law,3 and the court's holding finally clarifies the exclusivity
issue of the Pennsylvania appraisal remedy.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation desired to merge into Jones
& Laughlin Industries, Inc., II, a wholly owned subsidiary of Jones
& Laughlin Industries, Inc., which also owned eighty-one percent of
the Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation common stock. The merger
was consummated after approval was given by the Pennsylvania Department of State,4 the Jones and Laughlin Board of Directors, and a
majority of the Jones and Laughlin shareholders. Refusing to accept
the steel company's offer of twenty-nine dollars per share of common
stock, a number of the minority shareholders dissented to the
merger5 pursuant to sections 9086 and 515' of the Business Corporal. - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 398 A.2d 186 (1979).
2. Business Corporation Law, Act of May 5, 1933, P.L. 364, No. 106 §§ 515, 908, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1515, 1908 (Purdon 1967 & Supp. 1979-80) (hereinafter cited as BCL).
3. Section 515K was added to the Business Corporation Law by the Act of July il,
1957, P.L. 711, No. 370, § 1, as amended by the Act of Nov. 10, 1959, P.L. 1406, No. 502, § 1,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1515K (Purdon 1967).
4. A certificate of merger was issued pursuant to BCL § 905, which provides,
The articles of merger or articles of consolidation, as the case may be, shall be
delivered to the Department of State which shall, upon filing the articles, issue to the
corporation, or its representative, a certificate of merger or a certificate of consolidation, as the case may be.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1905 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
5. The court did not consider whether any or all of the dissenters properly perfected
their appraisal rights under BCL § 1515B, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1515B (Purdon Supp.
1979-80). See In re Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., - Pa. Super. Ct. at - n.5, 398 A.2d at 188
n.5.
6. The pertinent provision of BCL § 908 provides,
A. If any shareholder of a domestic corporation becomes a party to a plan of
merger or consolidation shall object to such plan of merger or consolidation and shall
comply with the provisions of section 515 of this act, such shareholders shall be entitled to the rights and remedies of dissenting shareholders therein provided if any.

tion Law. Accordingly, Jones & Laughlin filed a petition in the
Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, seeking both appraisal and forced sale of the dissenters' common stock.8
Several dissenters answered the petition alleging, among other
things,9 that the merger violated Pennsylvania law and that their
rights under the Business Corporation Law were inadequately protected because of a failure to provide for future earnings and benefits
that would have accrued but for the merger. The dissenters further
requested that the court find the merger invalid and order its recission.l0 Although Jones & Laughlin challenged the appraisal court's
jurisdiction to entertain these requests," the court accepted the dissenters' argument that the appraisal action could not proceed without prior determination of the validity of the merger and therefore,
ordered a hearing on the issue. The Pennsylvania Superior Court
reversed, remanding the case with instructions to proceed with the
appraisal action. 2
Generally speaking, every state in the United States and the
District of Columbia has an appraisal statute delineating shareholders' rights to dissent' 3 to certain corporate actions. 14 These statutes
permit the majority to implement a fundamental change in corporate
structure "on condition that the dissenting minority is afforded an
opportunity to be bought out at a fair price."' 5 Thus, the dissenting
shareholder is given the right to withdraw from the corporation and
receive the appraised value of his interest in the corporation. 16 In
seeking to provide for procedural difficulties, modem appraisal statPA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1908A (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
7. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1515 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
8. Jones & Laughlin's offer to the dissenters was required by BCL § 515, which also
permits the corporation to institute an appraisal action after the dissenters refuse an offer and
fail to institute an appraisal action themselves. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1515D, 1515F
(Purdon 1967).
9. The dissenters also requested that the court appoint an independent appraiser and
assess all costs of the proceedings against Jones & Laughlin. See Reproduced Record at 24a28a, In re Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 398 A.2d 186 (1979).

10. Id
11. Jones & Laughlin made other jurisdictional arguments that the court found unnecessary to reach because of its construction of § 515K. See In re Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., _
Pa. Super. Ct. at - n.15, 398 A.2d at 193 n.15.
12. Id at -, 398 A.2d at 193.
13. There are numerous names for a minority shareholder's right to withdraw from corporate actions and receive the fair value of his shares. The list includes "appraisal remedy,"
"cashout rights," "right of appraisal," "right to dissent," "right of withdrawal," and "right to
dissent and obtain payment for shares." See F. CONRAD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE
§ 134 (1976); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. §§ 80-81 (2d ed. 1971) (hereinafter
cited as MBCA); Conrad, Amendments ofthe MBCA Affecting Dissenter's Rights (§§ 73, 74, 80

& 81), 33 Bus. LAW. 2587 (1978).
14. See MBCA, supra note 13, § 80, P 6 (Supp. 1977).
15. Z. CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS WITH TAX PLANNING § 112.01 (1979).
16. See N. LATTIN, LATTIN ON CORPORATIONS 516 (1959); MCCORD, O'NEILL, PEARLMAN, & STROUD, COURSE MATERIALS ON BUYING, SELLING, AND MERGING BUSINESSES

§ 6.104 (1975).

utes have become long, intricate, and expensive to use.' 7 Availability" and scope of the appraisal rights afforded' 9 vary considerably
among the states. While the specific rights of the dissenter2 ° and the
valuation of a dissenter's shares 2' are frequently in dispute, the most
unsettled and perhaps the most important issue is the exclusiveness
of the appraisal remedy.
A shareholder dissenting to fundamental corporate changes has
enjoyed the statutory appraisal remedy in Pennsylvania since 1909.22
Unfortunately, Pennsylvania case law regarding the exclusivity of
the appraisal remedy is sparse and has vacillated greatly over the
years. 23 Initial Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions held that the
appraisal remedy was an alternative remedy to suits in equity to enjoin a merger or to obtain actual payment for a dissenter's stock
under the rationale that the appraisal statute used the word "may"
and was, therefore, discretionary. 24 If, however, the dissenter permitted the merger to occur without protecting his rights, he was then
limited to an action against the new corporation for the value of his
17. Manning, The Shareholder'sAppraisal Remedy: An Essayfor Frank Coker, 72 YALE
L.J. 223, 231 (1962). Manning noted that appraisal statutes "will likely be found to provide
answers to almost all procedural questions except those that actually arise." Id at 231 n.22.
The typical appraisal procedure requires the dissenter to give advance, written notice of
his intention to dissent, to refrain from voting in favor of the corporate action, to demand
payment within a short time span, and to tender his certificates. Further court procedures and
appeals may follow after appraisal. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1975); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 623 (McKinney 1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1515B (Purdon Supp. 1979-80);
MBCA, supra note 13, § 81; F. CONRAD, supra note 13, § 136.
18. Fundamental corporate changes that generally give rise to rights of appraisal include
merger, consolidation, sale of all or substantially all of the corporate assets, charter amendments, and sometimes dissolution. See CAVITCH, supra note 15, § 112.02; F. CONRAD, supra
note 13, § 135. Pennsylvania grants appraisal rights in the first four instances. See PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1311, 1810, 1908 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
19. Pennsylvania does not provide rights to dissenting shareholders (unless the articles or
board resolution authorizing the transaction provides otherwise) when the corporation is listed
on the New York or American Stock Exchanges, when the corporation has at least 2500 shareholders, or when there is a short merger pursuant to section 902 of the BCL. The exceptions,
however, do not apply when the shares are of a preferred or special class; when the shares are
converted into shares solely of the acquiring, surviving, or new corporation; or when the corporate action involves an amendment to the articles to which BCL § 810 applies. See PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1515L, 1515M (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). Similar exceptions found in the
Model Business Corporation Act, which the Pennsylvania exceptions were based upon, have
been eliminated in the proposed amendments to the Act because actual access to market value,
when the stock is traded widely, is no longer accepted as a reasonable alternative for dissenting
shareholders. See Conrad, supra note 13, at 2595.
20. For a general discussion concerning when the dissenting shareholder ceases to occupy his status as a stockholder and loses his rights of participation in corporate management,
dividends, and preemption, see generally Lattin, Remedies of the Dissenting Stockholder Under
AppraisalStatutes, 45 HARV. L. REV. 233, 251-58 (1931).
21. For a general discussion of the valuation of a dissenter's shares, see id at 25 8-70. See
also 78 DICK. L. REV. 582 (1973) (valuation under the BCL in Pennsylvania).
22. See Act of May 3, 1909, P.L. 408, No. 229, § 5, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1908 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
23. See notes 24-28 infra.
24. See Dickinson v. Fire Ass'n. of Philadelphia, 378 Pa. 396, 106 A.2d 607 (1954); In re
Beckman, 334 Pa. 81, 5 A.2d 342 (1939); Petry v. Harwood Elec. Co., 280 Pa. 142, 124 A. 302
(1924); Barnett v. Philadelphia Market Co., 218 Pa. 649, 67 A. 912 (1907).

25
stock in the nonsurviving corporation.
Beginning in 1941 a series of decisions emerged confusing the
exclusivity aspect of the appraisal remedy. In Hubbard v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp.,2 6 the Federal District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania appeared to indicate that the appraisal remedy was exclusive. Notwithstanding this decision, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court indicated eleven years later in Duddy v. Conshohocken Printing Co. 27 that the remedy was not exclusive in cases
concerning fraud, even though fraud had not been alleged in Duddy.
Finally, the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held in Troupiansky v. Henry Disston & Sons, Inc.2 8 that the
remedy was exclusive only if a corporation chose to follow the procedures set forth in the Business Corporation Law. Consequently, with
no definitive guidelines to follow, the Jones & Laughlin court attempted to clarify the doctrine of exclusivity in Pennsylvania.
In attempting to explain section 515K 2 9 of the Business Corporation Law, the Jones & Laughlin court examined the history of appraisal statutes in general.3" Prior to the enactment of modern
business corporation laws, shareholders' unanimous consent was
necessary to authorize fundamental corporate changes such as mergers or consolidations.3 Any shareholder, regardless of motive or the
size of his interest, could object to changes and demand to be bought
off at his "nuisance value."3 2 Since this state of affairs was unsatisfactory to both the corporation and the dissenting shareholders,3 3 the
25. In re Beckman, 334 Pa. 81, 5 A.2d 342 (1939).
26. In Hubbard v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 42 F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Pa. 1941), the
court first found the merger valid and then stated,
[Bly the Pennsylvania Act of March 31, 1941, amending section 908 of the Merger
Statute, the remedy of appraisal is the only remedy the plaintiffs have in the instant
case. The Act [adds,] "The rights and remedies at law or in equity of any shareholder
who desires to object to, or to dissent from, any merger or consolidation shall be
limited to those prescribed under this section, and such rights and remedies shall be
exclusive."
Id at 435.
27. 171 Pa. Super. Ct. 140, 90 A.2d 394 (1952). See also Miller v. Steinbach, 268 F. Supp.
255, 269-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (Pennsylvania appraisal remedy not exclusive in cases involving
fraud).
28. 151 F. Supp. 609 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
29. BCL § 515K provides,
Any shareholder, who desires to object to, or to dissent from, any proposed plan
authorized under any section of this act, and where this act provides that shareholders so objecting or dissenting shall have the rights and remedies herein provided,
shall be limited to the rights and remedies prescribed under this section, and the
rights and remedies prescribed by this section shall be exclusive.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1515K (Purdon 1967).
30.
31.

- Pa. Super. Ct. at -, 398 A.2d at 191-92.

Z. CAVITCH, supra note 15, at § 112.01; 13 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW

OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5906.1 (7th ed. 1970); Ballantine & Sterling, Upsetting Mergers
and Consolidations:Alternative Remedies ofADissenting Shareholdersin California, 27 CAL. L.
REv. 644 (1939).

32. See note 31 supra.
33. Lattin, supra note 20, at 236-37. Corporations were forced to compromise with dissenting shareholders or risk the danger of having the transaction set aside or enjoined after

pendulum began to swing in the direction favoring group action.
Merger statutes were enacted recognizing that fundamental corporate changes were frequently in the corporation's interest and sometimes even necessary to its very survival.3 4 With the majority's
almost unlimited power to change the nature and shape of the enterprise, the function of appraisal statutes became clear. They met a
conceptual and ideological problem-how to preserve the constitutionality of the merger statutes.3 5 Appraisal statutes were enacted,
therefore, to provide the dissenting shareholder with the opportunity
to withdraw from the corporation and receive the appraised value of
his shares.
The Jones & Laughlin court recognized that appraisal statutes
were not a panacea, since dissenters were still capable of thwarting
the majority's will when appraisal was viewed by the courts as an
alternative rather than an exclusive remedy. 36 Nevertheless, recission was rarely granted because its actual or possible allowance had
the practical effect of frustrating the will of the majority by placing
the validity of the merger in doubt and delaying its ultimate execution. Furthermore, the desires of those dissenters seeking only the
appraisal remedy were frustrated until the court rendered a decision
on the merits of the recission action.3 7
In light of this historical context, the Jones & Laughlin court
concluded,
By providing that the appraisal remedy "shall be exclusive"
the legislature must have intended to avoid the difficulties . ..
that would be experienced if the remedy was regarded as only an
alternative to an action for rescission. The legislature's expectation, or hope, must have been that .. .if it limited the court's

power of inquiry, i.e., its jurisdiction, to making an appraisal, it
costly preparation. Likewise, the burden of bringing suit was costly and, at best, uncertain for
the dissenter. Id
34. Id See generally Ballantine & Sterling, supra note 31.
35. Manning, supra note 17, at 246-47. Lattin observes that a merger results in the conversion of a shareholder's property interest, which has an ascertainable value represented by
definite corporeal and incorporeal property previous to the change. After the merger is consummated, the property that had made the share valuable no longer exists. Therefore, the
shareholder is entitled to the full value of his shares. See Lattin, supra note 20, at 236.
One authority contends that if appraisal is held an exclusive remedy, the statute still
would be unconstitutional as confiscatory since "there is more in a share of stock than the right
to its cash value." Levy, Rights ofDissenting Shareholders to Appraisal and Payment, 15 CORNELL L.Q. 420, 427 (1930).
36. - .Pa. Super. Ct. at -, 398 A.2d at 191. See notes 23 & 27 supra. It has been stated, "If
the object is to assist the majority in carrying out their policies, notwithstanding the objections
of the minority, then the majority's plan should not be hampered by protracted litigation." R.
STEVENS, STEVENS ON CORPORATIONS § 128 (2d ed. 1949). This appears to be the view of the

Jones & Laughlin court, at least after consummation of a merger. Indeed, some courts have
balanced the hardships and have denied the equitable remedy when the harm would be greater
to the majority than to the minority if the equitable remedy were granted. See Patterson v.
Shattuck Ariz. Copper Co., 186 Minn. 611, 244 N.W. 281 (1932); Ontjes v. Bagley, 217 Iowa
1200, 250 N.W. 17 (1933).
37. See generally Ballantine & Sterling, supra note 31.

would achieve the objective of preventing dissenting shareholders
. . . from frustrating or impeding the will of both the majority,

who wanted the merger, and of other dissenters, who wanted an
appraisal.38
The only possible alternative construction of section 515K-that the
legislature intended the courts to determine the validity of the
merger and if the merger was found invalid, the court's power to
grant relief should be limited to ordering an appraisal-was "absurd," particularly considering the prolonged and expensive inquiry
into the validity of a merger.3 9
The Jones & Laughlin court emphasized two additional points
in support of its interpretation of section 515K. First, the court adhered "to the established principle that any act of the legislature said
to limit the jurisdiction of a court must be strictly construed."4 0 It is
the duty of the court to give effect to legislative intent, and the Pennsylvania appraisal statute clearly states that "the rights and remedies
prescribed by this section shall be exclusive. 4 The court's construction is demonstrative of the generally strict enforcement of the procedural letter of appraisal statutes.4 2 Second, the Jones & Laughlin
court refused to interfere with the exclusive province of the legislature because appraisal statutes involve matters of public policy that
are fundamentally within the power of the legislature.4 3
Contending that the threshold question was the validity of the
merger, the dissenting shareholders relied upon Hubbard v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp.4" to support their position. In Hubbard, the
court determined the validity of the merger before determining
whether appraisal was the dissenters' sole remedy. The Jones &
Laughlin court easily distinguished Hubbard because the issue in
that case was whether the Business Corporation Law authorized a
recapitalization of preferred stock into a new series of preferred
stock pursuant to a merger, thus entitling the dissenters to an ap38. - Pa. Super. Ct. at _, 396 A.2d at 192.
39. Id For additional arguments in favor of exclusive appraisal remedies, see generally
Ballantine & Sterling, supra note 31.
40. - Pa. Super. Ct. at -, 398 A.2d at 191. See also I PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921
(Purdon Supp. 1979-80); Commonwealth v. Barford, 160 Pa. Super. Ct. 59, 50 A.2d 36 (1946);
Kohn v. Philadelphia, 156 Pa. Super. Ct. 112, 39 A.2d 531 (1944).
41. - Pa. Super. Ct. at -, 398 A.2d at 191 (emphasis added). See also Casey v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 463 Pa. 606, 345 A.2d 695 (1975).
42. Manning, supra note 17, at 231. Manning observes a paradox with strict construction
of appraisal statutes since the statutes are supposedly remedial in character and the courts tend
to stretch the scope of their application. Id See also Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Baldwin Sec.
Corp., 15 Pa. D. & C.2d 614 (C.P. Phila. 1958). One commentator has observed, "The only
safe advice is to 'cross all t's and dot all i's' if the appraisal remedy is desired." N. LATTIN,
supra note 16, at 525.
43. "The desirability of making appraisal of shares exclusive of irresponsible attacks to
set aside a consolidation or merger is at least a fairly debatable measure, a question of legislative policy in devising forms of remedies which will not unduly hamper and threaten the transaction of legitimate business." Ballantine & Sterling, supra note 31, at 651.
44. 42 F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Pa. 1941). See note 26 and accompanying text supra.

praisal.4 5 In contrast, the dissenting shareholders in Jones & Laughlin were not claiming that a cash merger was not authorized; rather,
they were alleging "conduct
akin to fraud" and were asking for a
46
rescission of the merger.
Likewise, the court easily distinguished the second major case
relied upon by the dissenting shareholders-Miller v. Steinbach.4 7
Miller merely held that section 515K does not bar a dissenter's action for fraud under the Federal Securities Laws,4" which is consistent with the general principle that an action for violation of the
Federal Securities Laws may be maintained despite the existence of
a state appraisal statute.4 9
Responding to contrary decisions in other jurisdictions, the
Jones & Laughlin court noted the recent Delaware case, Singer v.
Magnavox,5 0 that reversed prior case law in Delaware and held that
appraisal is not the dissenters' exclusive remedy." The Singer court
specifically found that Delaware courts could examine the "fairness"
of a merger and that a freeze-out merger lacking a business purpose
constitutes a breach of the majority's fiduciary duty to the minority. 2 Despite recent decisions similar to Singer in other jurisdictions,5 3 the Jones & Laughlin court was not persuaded by the cases
because the doctrine of exclusiveness in Pennsylvania, unlike Delaware, is statutory in nature and not a common-law development.
Rather, the doctrine "is one upon which the Pennsylvania legislature
has spoken . . . and has not been persuaded to abandon."54
The Jones & Laughlin court summarily dismissed what it reIn re Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., - Pa. Super. Ct. at - n. 13, 398 A.2d at 192 n. 13.
Id at -, 398 A.2d at 190.
47. 268 F. Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
48. In re Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., - Pa. Super. Ct. at - n. 13, 398 A.2d at 192 n. 13.
The Miller holding is unaffected by the Jones & Laughlin decision, but the Miller dicta regarding § 515K is overruled for all practical purposes.
49. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714
(2d Cir. 1972); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
970 (1967); Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965).
50. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). See generally Note, Singer v. Magnavox: Minority Rights in
Freeze Out Mergers, 83 DICK. L. REV. 159 (1978).
51. Cf Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (1962) (appraisal
held exclusive remedy in Delaware for short mergers). Instead of directly overruling the Stauffer case, the Singer court stated, "Any statement in Stauffer inconsistent herewith is held inapplicable to a § 251 [long form] merger." Singer v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del. 1977).
Thus, the question remains in Delaware whether short mergers continue as an exception to the
Singer holding. Id
52. Singer v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del. 1977). Cf.Gabhart v. Gabhart, - Ind.
_,370 N.E.2d 345 (1977) (freeze-out lacking business purpose constitutes a de facto dissolution); People v. Conrad Fabrics, Inc., 83 Misc. 2d 120, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1975), af'd,50 App.
Div. 2d 787, 377 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1975) (freeze-out lacking business purpose constitutes fraudulent practice under state blue sky laws).
53. See note 52 supra.
54. - Pa. Super. Ct. at -, 398 A.2d at 193. Accord, Yanow v. Teal Indus., Inc., - Conn. _,
45.
46.

_ A.2d - (1979).

ferred to as "severe criticism" of the exclusivity doctrine.5 5 This criticism, however, merits discussion since it is abundant and
persuasive. Even those appraisal statutes deemed to be exclusive
have various exceptions, including the Pennsylvania statute.5 6 Furthermore, the superior court strongly suggested, "If the doctrine of
exclusiveness were a product of our case law we might be inclined to
re-examine the policy supporting it in light of the criticism directed
against it."57
Courts have been unable to define standards of fairness when
the appraisal remedy is exclusive. For example, the judiciary has not
clearly enunciated whether only the mere appraised value of the dissenting shareholder's interest merits protection when appraisal is relied upon as an exclusive remedy.5" Furthermore, courts have failed
to determine the minority's exact losses in a freeze-out.59 Accordingly, these difficulties have evoked inconsistent protection of the interests concerned. When appraisal totally blocks judicial review of
the substantive fairness of transactions, the majority obtains absolute
control over the corporation, which defeats any interest the minority
had.6' Contrariwise, the majority may be forced to abandon their
plans altogether when the potential cash drain becomes so great as a
result of paying a sizeable minority the appraised value of their
shares.6' It is apparent that an ideal middle ground must be found
to protect all interests, which obviously dictates the necessity of a
flexible rather than exclusive appraisal remedy.
The most frequently cited commentator criticizing exclusive appraisal remedies is Professor Vorenberg. He has discussed the difficulties in obtaining the fair value of a dissenter's shares, 62 the
55, - Pa. Super. Ct. at -, 398 A.2d 192-93.

56.

See note 19 and accompanying text supra.

57.

- Pa. Super. Ct. at -, 398 A.2d at 193.

58. Comment, Protection of Minority Shareholders From Freeze-Outs Through Mergers,
22 WAYNE L. REV. 1421, 1446 (1976). Investors are often interested in something different
than appraisal, such as the desire to maintain an interest in the business. Id
59. Id
60. Id at 1447.
61. Id See also Manning, supra note 17, at 234; R. STEVENS, supra note 36, at 596. This
in fact happens in Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, 392 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Fla.
1974).
62. Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the DissentingStockholder's Appraisal Right, 77 HARV. L.
REy. 1189, 1201-02 (1964). Vorenberg has identified seven potential problem areas connected
with obtaining the fair value of a dissenter's stock: (1) Failure to comply with provisions of the
statutes may deprive a dissenter of his appraisal right altogether; (2) the procedure involves
delay and uncertainty, with concurrent expenses cutting into the dissenter's recovery; (3) the
valuation process itself may involve a significant financial sacrifice; (4) an absolute freeze-out
right denies the dissenter the choice to sell his stock at a more advantageous price; (5) the
corporation may deliberately depress the market price for the purpose of deceiving the stockholders and appraiser; (6) the dissenter is deprived of the benefit of improved prospects as a
result of the corporate change; and (7) the appraisal process tends to produce conservative
results when the values are speculative, and the majority's power to pick the time to trigger
appraisal may encourage them to move when full values are temporarily obscured. Id

inherent lack of consideration for a shareholder's other possible relationships to the corporiation,6 3 and the dissenting shareholder's potential tax difficulties when forced to cash in his shares.6 4 Vorenberg
suggests that only when a plausible business purpose separate from a
desire to freeze-out the minority or enlarge the majority's stockholdings exists should a minority holder be forced to choose between acquiescing to the majority's will or receiving the appraised value of
his shares.6 5
Supportive of Vorenberg's position, many commentators have
asserted that the legislative intent of appraisal statutes was directed
toward legal rather than illegal action by the majority.6 6 The mere
fact that shareholders can be compensated does not justify unlawful
or fraudulent proceedings by the corporation. 67 Therefore, "no majority, however large, should be permitted to run rough shod over
the minority, however small, by illegal action or legal action carried
out by illegal means. ' 68 While the exclusiveness of the appraisal
remedy has merit under some circumstances, alternative equitable
remedies can and should be adapted to prevent injustice in unlawful
and fraudulent situations.69
It is significant to note that section 5E7 ° of the Pennsylvania
63. Id at 1203. "Putting to one side any emotional wrench involved in leaving the corporation, liquidation of his stock interest may undermine in whole or in part the incentive for
such other relationship such as employee, patent licensor, or lender." Id. This is particularly
true in closely held corporations.
64. Id Unwanted and unfavorable tax gains may be forced upon the dissenter. Id
65. Id at 1204. Professor Brudney has elaborated on Vorenberg's criticisms. Brudney
asserts that the very corporate structure disadvantages the minority since crucial valuation
evidence is most often in the hands of management and unavailable to outsiders. Additionally, the majority has a presumptive advantage in the litigation setting since courts afford a
wide scope of discretion to management decisionmaking. Furthermore, the appraised value of
a dissenter's shares does not reflect economic factors such as the cost of finding an equivalent
investment (if this is even possible) or the discounting effect as a result of inflation and delay in
receiving his money because of the litigation process. Finally, Brudney emphasizes that appraisal cannot give effect to the increment in value or opportunity that the corporation acquires by reason of the corporate change. Brudney, .4Note on Going Private, 61 VA. L. REV.
1019 (1975). See also Manning, supra note 17, at 245.
This latter criticism was also emphasized by Vorenberg. See note 62 and accompanying
text supra. Likewise, the Jones & Laughlin dissenters asserted the same in their new matter.
See Reproduced Record at 25a-26a, In re Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., - Pa. Super. Ct. _,
398 A.2d 186 (1979).
66. See, e.g., Conrad, supra note 13, at 2596; Lattin, supra note 20, at 247.
67. See note 66 supra.
68. Lattin, supra note 20, at 245.
69. See R. STEVENS, supra note 36, at 595. But see Ballantine & Sterling, supra note 31,
at 658-59, in which it is asserted that appraisal is adequate even when fraudulent action is
involved, particularly in light of the insurmountable, practical hardships of attempting to undo
and set aside a complex combination affecting numerous persons.
70. BCL § 5E provides,
Notwithstanding subsection A of this section, a shareholder shall not have any
right to obtain, in the absence offraud or fundamental unfairness, an injunction
against any proposedplan or amendment of articles authorized under any section of
this act, or to claim the right to valuation of and payment for his shares because of
any such plan or amendment except that he may dissent and claim payment if and to
the extent provided in section 515 of this act where this act expressly provides that

Business Corporation Law states with particularity that a challenge
to a plan of merger may be brought prior to its consummation if
fraud or fundamental unfairness is alleged. 7 ' Consequently, appraisal is not the dissenter's exclusive remedy pnior to conswnmation
of a merger. By failing to note section 5E of the Business Corporation Law and by limiting its holding to consummated mergers, the
superior court missed the opportunity to fully clarify the exclusivity
issue in Pennsylvania. 2
Despite any criticism, the Jones & Laughlin court was justified
in its construction of section 515K of the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law, since a literal reading of the statute cannot result in an
otherwise reasonable interpretation. Thus, In re Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp. significantly clarifies the Pennsylvania appraisal law and
sets definitive guidelines for Pennsylvania appraisal courts to follow.
These courts have no power to entertain disputes involving the validity of a consummated merger, since section 515K clearly manifests
the legislative intent to bar all but appraisal actions after a merger
has been consummated.7 3 Extension of this holding to other consummated fundamental corporate changes permitted under the Business Corporation Law is inevitable. The court unfortunately left
unanswered the question of whether an action to enjoin a proposed
merger prior to its consummation is permissible. A literal reading,
however, of section 5E of the Business Corporation Law appears to
permit such an action in the event of fraud or fundamental unfairness, at least with respect to proposed mergers.7 4
Significantly, the Jones & Laughlin court did recognize the existence of persuasive criticism regarding the exclusiveness of the appraisal remedy when unlawful or fraudulent conduct is discovered.
It is, however, the province of the Pennsylvania legislature to change
the Business Corporation Law to reflect those suggestions. Consedissenting shareholders shall have the rights and remedies provided in section 515 of
this act.
PA. STAT. ANN.tit 15, § 1005E (Purdon Supp. 1979-80) (emphasis added).
71. Brief for Appellant at 18, In re Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., - Pa. Super. CL - 398
A-2d 186 (1979).
72. The court stated, "Nothing in this opinion should be read as in any way reflecting on
the issue of whether an action to enjoin a proposed merger before the vote may lie." - Pa.
Super. CL at - h14,398 A.2d at 192 n.14.
73. - Pa. Super. Ct. at _,398 A.2d at 186.
74. See note 70 and accompanying text supra BCL § 5E applies to proposed transactions. It is forseeable, however, that fraud or unlawfulness may not be discovered until after a
fundamental corporate change has been consummated. See e.., J.L Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426 (1964) (court noted that cursory reviews of proxy statements and prospectuses do not
necessarily discover unlawfulness, which often is not apparent to the SEC until after a merger).
Thus, perhaps the BCL should be altered to cover such situations, particularly in light of the
numerous authorities in favor of appraisal as an alternative to an action for rescission of a
corporate change tainted with fraud or unlawfulness. See, eg., Conrad,supra note 13, at 2596
(proposed amendments to the Model Business Corporation Act favor alternative equitable
remedies when corporate changes are tainted with fraud or unlawfulness).
[Casenote by Bradford J. Harris]

quently, if a dissenter's interest in a corporation is to receive the protection it deserves while simultaneously protecting the dominant
interests of the corporation, legislative rather than judicial change is
necessitated.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FIRST AMENDMENT ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE - STATE INCOME TAX DEDUCTION FOR PARENTS OF
CHILDREN IN NONPUBLIC SCHOOLS HELD To BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL ADVANCEMENT OF RELIGION. Public Fundsfor Public

Schools of N.J v. Byrne, 590 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1979), af'd
mem., 99 S.Ct. 2818 (1979).

Public FundsforPublic Schools of N.J v. Byrne I marked an unsuccessful attempt of the New Jersey legislature to aid nonpublic
schools by providing a statutory tax deduction 2 to parents with children in nonpublic elementary or secondary schools on a full-time
basis. The Third Circuit limited its review to the following narrow
legal issue: was New Jersey's tax exemption similar to the tax exemptions sustained by the United States Supreme Court in Walz v.
Tax Commission' or similar to the tax relief invalidated in Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist?4 After determining that the tax
exemption resembled the tax relief in Nyquist, the court affirmed the
judgment of the district court 5 and held the statute to be violative of
the establishment clause of the first amendment to the Constitution.6
The $1,000 tax deduction had the primary effect of advancing religion since it did not extend to parents of children in public schools as
well as to parents of children in private schools.7
The challenged statute was a section of the newly enacted New
Jersey state income tax. In addition to the $1,000 deduction to parents of nonpublic school children, the legislature provided various
other groups with additional $1,000 deductions.' Only the nonpubI. 590 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1979), aff'dmem., 99 S.Ct. 2818 (1979).
2. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54A:3-1(b)(2) (West Supp. 1977) provides in pertinent part as follows:
(b) Additional exemptions. In addition to the personal exemptions allowed in
(a), the following additional personal exemptions shall be allowed as a deduction
from gross income:
(2) For each dependent who qualifies as a dependent of the taxpayer during the
taxable year for Federal income tax purposes - $1,000.00 plus, for each dependent
child attending on a full-time basis an elementary or secondary educational institution not deriving its primary support from public monies - $1,000.00.
3. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
4. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
5. See Public Funds for Pub. Schools of N.J. v. Byrne, 444 F. Supp. 1228 (D.N.J. 1978).
6. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
7. 590 F.2d at 520.
8. The court of appeals summarized the additional authorized exemptions as follows:

lic school deduction was subjected to constitutional attack, however.
The district court looked beyond the legislative label to recognize
that aid to nonpublic schools meant aid to sectarian schools.9 Although the benefits from the tax deduction flowed to the parents
rather than the sectarian institution itself, the district court and the
court of appeals concluded that the exemption directly aided religion.' o The district court also held the tax scheme unconstitutional
on the grounds of excessive state entanglement with religion. " The
court of appeals, however, did not find it necessary to address the
entanglement issue.
The first amendment religion clauses were made applicable to
the states through incorporation by the fourteenth amendment 2 in
1940."3 The Supreme Court did not interpret the establishment
clause as bearing on the states until 1947 with Everson v. Board of
Education 1" Prior to Everson, few cases raised an establishment
6
clause issue. 5 Sectarian schools did not need or want government'
This exemption for dependents in nonpublic schools is one of several $1,000 exemptions for which a taxpayer might be eligible. Beside a $1,000 personal exemption, a
taxpayer can claim additional $1,000 exemptions if he or she has a spouse, if the
taxpayer or spouse is 65 or older, if the taxpayer or spouse is blind or disabled, or if a
dependent of the taxpayer attends a college or university and receives from the taxpayer at least half thecosts of tuition and maintenance. NJ.S.A. 54A- 3-1(b)(1)-(6),
54A.3-1.1 (West Supp. 1977).
Id at 516.

9. 444 F. Supp. at 1229-30. Since no testimony was presented, the district court accepted as "undisputed fact" the break-down of nonpublic schools as listed in the defendants'
brief. Of the 753 nonpublic schools in New Jersey, the affiliations were as follows 575 Roman
Catholic, 8 Lutheran, 20 Jewish, 3 Episcopalian, 48 Christian, 39 Independent, and 60 Other.

These figures convinced the court to strike the entire statute and not permit deductions to
parents with children in nonsectarian private schools. The court concluded the legislature
would not enact tax relief for such a small percentage of taxpayers.
Aid to nonpublic schools is synonymous with aid to Catholic Schools. -From Everson to
Wommn inclusive, the Supreme Court rendered 13 major decisions concerning governmental
aid to sectarian schools. Of these 13 decisions, 12 involved fact situations in which Catholic
schools were the principal beneficiaries of the governmental aid in question." Buchanan, GovernmenwlAidto SectarianScAoo, 15 Hous. L.REv. 783, 785 n.17 (1978). For a list of these
cases, see id at 789 n-39. The one case not involving Catholic schools dealt with a Baptist
college. See Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
10. The court of appeals did not explain how the tax deduction would advance religion.
Judge Weis, although concurring in the judgment, was troubled by the divergent results
reached in Wa!z and Nyquia He could not see why tax exemptions for church property and
personal federal income tax deductions for direct contributions to religious organizations-direct aid to religion-were permissible, but indirect benefits through tax deductions to parents
of sectarian school children were unconstitutional 590 F.2d at 521.
11. 444 F. Supp. at 1231.
12. The applicable part of the amendment states: "No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without the due process of law...."
U.S. CoNT'r. amend. XIV,§ 1.
13. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). See aso Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
14. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
15. Proponents of the busing plan in Everson had little case law to rely on since first
amendment incorporation occurred merely seven years earlier. See, ag., Cochran v. Louisiana, 281 U.S. 370 (1930) (state aid to nonpublic schools in the form of textbooks for secular
subjects upheld because the expenditure was for a public purpose), Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210

aid.' 7 More importantly, opponents of such aid had no standing to
sue'8 since individual taxpayers could not bring suit questioning expenditures of federal tax monies until 1968.' 9 During the past three
decades, the Court has grappled with the problem of governmental
aid to sectarian schools on a case-by-case basis.2' Ingenious state
legislatures have devised a wide array of programs to circumvent the
establishment clause, 2 ' but the Court has demonstrated its own ingenuity in striking down many programs,2 2 utilizing a tripartite test

developed over the past thirty years.3
To conform to the restrictions imposed by the first amendment,
U.S. 50 (1908) (Indian funds held in trust by the federal government allowed for tuition at
Catholic mission schools because the money was considered private, not public); Bradfield v.
Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899) (congressional funds for expanding a hospital run by Roman
Catholic nuns approved because hospital perceived as a corporation with a secular purpose).
Advocates of sectarian aid also pointed to military chaplains to support their position.
Chaplains were paid by taxes, a public support of religion. The "G1. Bill" released public
funds for use at secular or sectarian colleges. Neither of these two policy examples, however,
has been influential in persuading the Court to approve aid to nonpublic schools. See Committee For Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 783 n-38 (1973).
16. Government refers to both state and federal levels throughout this article. Federal
aid to nonpublic schools began with Titles I and 11of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.
17. For a discussion of the change in Catholic leaders' attitudes towards government aid,
see R_ MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELGION 81-90 (1972).
18. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). Most states, however, allowed taxpayer
suits, so opponents of state aid could always sue through state courts and hope for possible
Supreme Court review. "But it was a very chancy business ... and it was difcult, expensive,
and in the final analysis futile to try to tease it out of state courts." R. MORGAN, supra note 17,
at 96.
19. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
20. Chief Justice Burger recognized that interpreting the establishment clause on an ad
hoc basis led to confusion.
In attempting to articulate the scope of the two Religion Clauses, the Court's opinions reflect the limitations inherent in formulating general principles on a case-bycase basis, The considerable internal inconsistency in the opinions of the Court derives from what, in retrospect, may have been too sweeping utterances on aspects of
these clauses that seemed clear in relation to the particular cases but have limited
meaning as general principles.
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1969).
21. See Young, Conrtraional Vality of State Aid to Piqil&in Chzch-Related Schools,
38 Omo ST. LJ.783 (1977).
Programs in conformity with the first amendment include school bus transportation, textbook loans, real property tax exemptions for religious organizations, federal construction
grants for church-related colleges, tax exempt bond assistance for construction at church-related colleges, direct per student grants to church-related colleges, standardized tests and scoring services, speech and hearing diagnostic services, physician, dental, and optometric services,
neutral-site therapeutic services, neutral-site remedial education services, programs for handicapped, neutral-site guidance and counseling, and assistance grants for students attending
church-related colleges. Id at 783-84.
22. Programs that failed to meet first amendment restrictions include salary supplements
for lay teachers, secular education service contracts calling for the state to pay the nonpublic
school for providing secular education, grants to schools for cost of general testing and record
keeping, tuition reimbursement for low income parents, parental tax credits, grants to schools
for maintenance and repair, parexital reimbursement grants, instructional equipment and material loaned to schools, on-premises health and remedial services, instructional equipment and
material loaned to pupils, and field trip transportation. Id
23. But see Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 663, 742 (1973) (the three factors "are no more
than helpful signposts"); Young smpra note 21, at 787-88.

a program for state aid to nonpublic schools must satisfy the following three criteria: first, have a secular purpose; 24 second, neither advance nor inhibit religion; 25 and last, avoid excessive state
entanglement with religion.26 Addition of the excessive entanglement factor has all but negated the earlier direct-indirect/primary
effect of advancing religion element.2 7 Moreover, state programs
with stringent guidelines designed to ensure furtherance of purely
secular ends will often be open to constitutional attack on the ground
of excessive administrative entanglement. Thus, the tripartite test
formulated by the Court creates a legislative dilemma.28
The controversy over aid to sectarian schools can be traced back
to the separationist philosophy of Thomas Jefferson, who wrote that
"there should be a wall of separation between church and state."2 9
24. The secular purpose test first appeared in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947), a five to four decision permitting parental reimbursement for the cost of transporting
their children to school via public bus service. A taxpayer challenged reimbursement for
transportation to sectarian schools. The court categorized the plan as public welfare legislation
designed to help parents transport their children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and from accredited schools.
The secular purpose of parochial aid legislation has never been doubted by the Court.
The secular purpose is generally cast as the legitimate state interest in providing a safe,
healthy, educational environment for children, promoting pluralism, and protecting an
overburdened public school system from forced acceptance of nonpublic school students if
nonpublic schools close. See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 764-65
(1973); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243, 247 (1968).
25. The second prong of the test came to light in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963) (religion intruding into governmental areas through Bible reading and the
Lord's Prayer in public schools held unconstitutional).
The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and primary effect of the
enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment
exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is
to say that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a
secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion.
Id at 222.
Justice White's majority opinion in Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), applied
the Schempp test to New York's decision to loan state approved textbooks to children in both
sectarian and secular elementary and high schools. The Court determined the textbooks had
the secular purpose of primarily advancing secular education and, therefore, the state's action
was not unconstitutional.
26. The excessive entanglement prong appeared in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664
(1970). The Court balanced taxation of church property used for religious purposes with exemption of such property. The degree of state involvement was markedly less through exemptions.
The entanglement factor in aid to sectarian school situations was first applied in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Constant state surveillance through administrative regulations and possible politically divisive requests for increased aid caused Pennsylvania's program, designed to finance teaching of secular subjects in nonpublic elementary and secondary
schools, to fail due to excessive state entanglement.
27. See Giannella, Lemon and Tilton. The Bitter and the Sweet ofChurch-StateEntanglement, in CHURCH AND STATE 114, 137-52 (P. Kurtland ed. 1975); Young, supra note 21, at
799-803.
28. Compare Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (excessive entanglement in
monitoring financed secular subject teachers in sectarian schools) with Levitt v. Committee for
Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (inadequate restrictions imposed to insure secular tests and
records alone would be funded).
29. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to The Danbury Baptist Assoc. (January 1, 1802), re-

The wall has appeared in several Supreme Court opinions,3" but
"[tihe wall has done what walls usually do: it has obscured the
view. . . Far from helping to decide cases, it has made opinions
and decisions unintelligible. The wall is offered as a reason. It is not
a reason; it is a figure of speech."' 1 Nevertheless, Jefferson's wall
continues to fascinate the Court, yet provides no concrete guidelines
on the perplexing problem of aid to sectarian schools.3 2 James
Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance, 33 which asserts that no taxpayer should be forced to "contribute threepence only of his property" to religion 34 is also frequently cited by strict separationists to
lend historical support to their perception of the church-state relationship.
The Court has recognized that Madison's ideal separation is impossible.3 An absolutist theory of nonestablishment would deny
any governmental aid or benefit to organized religion. Carried to an
extreme, the theory could prevent extending police and fire protection, connections for sewage disposal, or public highways and sidewalks to churches and church schools. 36 Nonestablishment could
result in governmental hostility towards religion in this era of inprinted in 8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 113 (Washington ed. 1861). See also
Hutchins, The Futureof the Wall in THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 17 (D. Oaks
ed. 1965).
30. See id.The wall first appeared in the opinion of Chief Justice Waite in Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878), a case holding that interference with religious polygamy
was not interference with religious freedom.
31. Hutchins, supra note 29, at 18. Mr. Hutchins has severely criticized the relationship
between the Court and the wall,
The wall builders on the Court may be accused of misplaced piety. Their devotional
sentiments might better have been directed to the Constitution - which speaks only of
the prohibition of establishment and the exercise of freedom - than to words appearing in what may have been a routine acknowledgment of a complimentary address,
words written by a man, however great, who did not take part in the adoption of the
First Amendment.
Id
32. See Buchanan, supra note 9, at 783. Buchanan's juxtaposition of the following quotations aptly testifies to the failure of the wall as a hard and fast rule: "The First Amendment
has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable.
We could not approve the slightest breach." Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
"We have acknowledged before, and we do so again here, that the wall of separation that must
be maintained between church and state is a blurred, indistinct and variable barrier depending
on all the circumstances of a particular relationship." Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236
(1977).
33. Rleprintedin Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 719-27 (1970).
34. Id at 721. The "Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments" triggered a storm of protest and defeated a 1784 Virginia Assessment Bill that would have imposed a tax to support Christian churches by subsidizing teachers. A taxpayer could choose
which sect he desired to fund. If the taxpayer indicated no preference, the tax would go towards education. Madison vigorously attacked the bill using concepts of free exercise and
nonestablishment of religion, concepts which he later formulated in the twin religion clauses of
the first amendment. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 36-38 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
35. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952). In an opinion declaring released
time programs constitutional, which permitted students to attend religious functions off public
school property, Justice Douglas wrote, "The First Amendment, however, does not say that in
every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church and State."
36. Id at 312.

creased governmental action in allocating social gains and resources.3" The Court has opted to resolve establishment clause cases
by using a theory of government neutrality towards religion.3" Since
interpretations of neutrality vary,39 however, this theory is not suited
for predicting the results the Court will reach when faced with an
establishment clause issue.
In conjunction with the neutrality principle, the Court has postulated other theories to justify decisions in aid to private school
cases. The "Child Benefit"' theory focuses on the direct recipient of
the aid and permits the state to aid a class of citizens, namely, children, by overlooking the fact that some of the children attend nonpublic schools. This approach enables the state to supply bus
transportation, 4 secular textbooks,4 2 standardized tests,4 3 and medical and diagnostic services" to all elementary and secondary students. The dichotomy between benefits to pupils and benefits to
sectarian schools has been soundly criticized by scholars,4 5 and the
Court has refused to expand the theory to justify benefits to parents
of nonpublic school students, as distinguished from benefits to sectarian schools.'
37. See generally Gianella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablirment and DoctrinalDevelopment, 81 HARv. L. REV.513 (1968).
38. Id at 518-19. The Court's neutrality principle reflects the tension between the free
exercise and nonestablishment clauses. Free exercise neutrality requires or permits certain
religious behavior to be free from governmental restrictions. See Braunfield v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599 (1961) (Sabbatarians exempted from Sunday closing laws). Political neutrality, recognizing that religious organizations operate in a secular world, allows governmental benefits
to flow equally to both religious and secular organizations.
In practice, the Court strives to insure a neutral relationship between government and
religion and between religion and nonreligion- But the effort to protect religious groups from
government hostility or sponsorship does not necessarily mean different groups are accorded
equal, neutral, treatment. Compare West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943) (Jehovahs Witnesses excused from school flag ceremony) with Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). Bible reading in public schools banned). Therefore, the concept of neutrality is an elusive, amorphous standard, best understood by looking at particular
cases.
39. For differing views interpreting neutrality, see Freund, Public Aid to Parochial
Schools, 82 HARv.L. REv. 1680, 1686-87 (1969); Gianella, Aupra note 37 at 513-36; Piekarski,
Nyquis and PublicAid to PrivateEducation, 58 MARQ.L REV.247, 261-64 (1975).
40. Piekarski, supra note 40, at 257.
41. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
42. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
43. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
44. Id
45. See Freund, supra note 39, at 1682-83. Freund compares the benefit to pupil-benefit
to sectarian school dichotomy with the ineffectual mid-nineteenth century effort to classify
local measures such as pilotage laws as either regulations of commerce or safety in order to
determine their validity.
46. For cases declaring financial aid to parents of nonpublic school students unconstitutional, see Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (tuition reimbursement
and tax relief); Public Funds for Pub. Schools of NJ. v. Marburger, 358 F. Supp. 29 (D.NJ.
1973). a/j'dmmn, 417 U.S. 961 (1974) (reimbursement to parents for money spent on secular
textbooks and instructional materials); Kosydar v. Wolman, 353 F. Supp. 744 (S.D. Ohio
1972), qd mb non, Grit v. Wolman, 413 U.S. 901 (1973) (tax credits to parents of private
school students). Wolman v. Essex, 342 F. Supp. 399 (S.D. Ohio 1972) aff'dmne, 409 U.S.
808 (1972) (grants to parents of ninety dollars per dependent child in nonpublic school); Min-

The secular-sectarian split attempts to separate the religious
function of nonpublic schools from the secular education function. 47
Although the Court recognized the dual nature of sectarian schools
in the 1960's,41 this approach to sustaining aid has been nullified by
the antithetical theory of permeation. The permeation view transforms any aid to religious schools into direct aid to organized religion since sectarian schools, by their very nature, are seen as being
heavily infused 49 with religious symbols, teachers,' ° and ceremonies.']
The Court's sterotyping of sectarian schools as inextricably permeated by religious indoctrination makes isolation of purely secular
functions all but impossible. Yet, presupposing that separation
could be attained,52 and aid would not advance religion, programs
would probably fail under the "excessive state entanglement with religion" prong of the three part test, because the state would have to
unleash its administrative machinery to ensure that public funds
would be used strictly for secular ends. 3
and the religious character of
Excessive state entanglement'
nonpublic schools pose difficult problems for extending aid at the
nesota Civil Liberties Union v. State, 302 Minn. 216, 224 N.W.2d 344 (1974), crt dAmfea 421
U.S. 988 (19175) (tax credits to private school parents).
47. See aLso Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899), in which the Court perceived the
secular function of a sectarian hospital.
48. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
49. Since 1971, the Supreme Court has perceived Catholic schools to be an integral part
of the Catholic church and has noted that religious authority and indoctrination pervade Catholic school systems. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
349 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Levitt v. Committee for
Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973) Lemon v. Kurtzman, Early v. DiCenso, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)
(Early was a Rhode Island case consolidated with Lemon which was a Pennsylvania case).
50. At least one Justice has expressed his distrust of sectarian school teachers. "One can
imagine what a religious zealot as contrasted with a civil libertarian can do with the Reformation or Inquisition." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 635-36 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring)51. The nature of sectarian schools in the Lemon and Early cases was discerned from the
official handbook of school regulations for the Rhode Island Diocese. The Court noted that
the schools were controlled by the bishop of Providence, had easy access to churches and
priests, and maintained a high ratio of teaching nuns to lay teachers. For a detailed treatment
of the Rhode Island profile, see Giannella, sipra note 27, at 127-37.
52. There was no attempt to separate the secular from the religious in Commmtee For
Pkb. Edue. v. Nyqzdrl, since the Court believed it was impossible to do so. 413 U.S. at 774.
53. See eg., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975). Under Meek, a state could loan
textbooks, but could not loan secular instructional materials to the nonpublic schools. The
Court did not explain how a secular pack of math cards advanced religion while a math text
book did not. Justice Rehnquist was disturbed by the contrary results, observing in his dissenting opinion, that "appellees are left to wonder, with good reason, whether the possibility of
meeting the entanglement test is now anything more than a 'promise to the ear to be broken to
the hope, a teasing illusion like a munificent bequest in a pauper's will.'" Id at 394.
54. The court in Wolman v. Essex, 342 F. Supp. 399, 413 (S.D. Ohio 1972), af'dmen,
409 U.S. 808 (1972), considered the following factors helpful in evaluating the degree of state
entanglement. use to which aid is put, form in which aid provided, to whom aid is directed,
extent state must intervene to ensure monies provided are used for constitutional secular purposes, the level and nature of political activity aid might engender, and the chance of fractionalizing the electorate along religious lines.

elementary and secondary school levels." Application of this standard to state and federal programs aiding sectarian institutions of
higher learning has produced contrary results.56 Because secular
academics are stressed in higher education, the Court has found that
the permeation of religious ideology is not as prevasive at sectarian
colleges and universities as at the lower levels of education.5 7 Therefore, the Court has upheld aid to private colleges and universities for
secular purposes 58 by rationalizing the entanglement test. 9
Public Funds/orPublic Schools of N.J v. Byrne 60 typifies state
efforts to increase the amount of constitutionally permissible aid to
nonpublic, predominantly Roman Catholic schools. 6' The parties
agreed on the facts 62 and on the tripartite test 63 used in determining
the constitutionality of the tax exemption. Plaintiffs64 stressed the
similarities between New Jersey's exemption and the invalid New
York tax scheme in Nyquist, while defendants 65 analogized the New
Jersey statute to the New York tax exemption sustained in Walz.
The court of appeals adhered to the standard formula used in establishment clause cases by immediately acknowledging the lack of
clear precedent and guiding policy:6 6 "This case presents recurring
and troublesome questions concerning the relationship between religion and government." 67 The court then reasserted Jefferson's wall
55. See notes 21 & 22 supra for list of state programs.
56. Compare Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), with Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672 (1971). Both cases were decided on the same day under the same test, yet aid to
nonpublic elementary and secondary schools was impermissible and aid to sectarian colleges
was upheld.
57. See Young, supra note 2 1, at 796-99 for categorization of this notion as a "religion
effectiveness" test. The Court seems to be making value judgments on how well sectarian
colleges inculcate religious beliefs. A poor showing of religious fervor will permit aid.
58. See Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (state noncategorical grants
to private colleges and universities restricted to use for secular purposes); Hunt v. McNair, 413
U.S. 734 (1973) (permissible to issue state revenue bonds for construction of secular buildings);
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (federal grants for construction of secular academic
facilities permitted).
59. The dissenting Justices in Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), refused to distinguish nonpublic colleges from grade schools. They also pointed out that although aid was
given in a lump sum grant, constant monitoring of the institution to ensure that the buildings
were not used for sectarian functions amounted to as much entanglement as long term funding.
60. 590 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1979).
61. See note 9 supra.
62. Id
63. See notes 24-28 and accompanying text supra.
64. Plaintiffs included over forty associations and individual taxpayers concerned with
the relationship between church and state. 590 F.2d at 514.
65. Defendants on appeal, besides New Jersey Governor Byrne, included New Jersey's
Director of Taxation and the Commissioner of Education. The Newark Archdiocesan Federation of Home School Associates and James P. Beggans, Jr., New Jersey General Assembly
were intervening party defendants. 590 F.2d at 514.
66. See Freund, supra note 39, at 1684-88. Three basic policy considerations underlay
first amendment protections: voluntarism; mutual abstenation; and government neutrality.
Freund feels the interplay between these elements is best left to the courts, not the legislature,
to decide, in order to avoid fractionalizing the people along religious lines.
67. 590 F.2d at 515.

of separation proposal along with the Supreme Court's neutrality
principle. 68 Armed with these two vague and often conflicting principles, the court bravely plunged into an analysis of Walz and Nyquist.
State aid to sectarian schools was not at issue in Wa/z, but the
language of the decision 69 upholding property tax exemptions to religious organizations for religious properties used solely for religious
worship7 ° encouraged accommodationists seeking such aid.7" Mr.
Walz, a New York City property owner and taxpayer,7 2 contended
that the New York City Tax Commission's grant of an exemption to
church property indirectly forced him to contribute to religious bodies, thereby violating provisions prohibiting the establishment of religion under the first amendment.7 3 Chief Justice Burger's majority
opinion noted that "[tlhe course of constitutional neutrality in this
area cannot be a straight line; rigidity could well defeat the basic
purpose of these provisions, which is to insure that no religion be
sponsored or favored, none commanded and none inhibited."7 4
Stating that there is "room to play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality,"7 the Chief Justice upheld the exemption on
several grounds.
First, churches were one of a broad class of entities that foster
the moral or mental improvement of the community 76 that were eligible for exemption. Second, churches had a long history of escaping taxation. Public acceptance of a practice almost two hundred
years old weighed heavily in favor of the exemption. Third, the
Court distinguished tax exemptions from state sponsorship. 77 Last,
68. Id at 516. See notes 20-32, 38-39 and accompanying text supra.
69. Walz was an eight to one decision. Chief Justice Burger wrote the opinion; Justice
Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion.
70. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
71. This encouraging sign for aid to sectarian schools proved unfounded. Far from
opening the doors for state aid, the Walz decision contributed the excessive state entanglement
part of the test that has prevented aid except in narrow circumstances.
72. The "shabby origins" of the Walz case are set out in R. MORGAN, supra note 17, at
105.
On May 20, 1967, one Frederick Walz purchased a small parcel of land in New York
City for $25. The property was assessed by the City at $100, and Walz was taxed at
$5.24 per year. In June of 1967 Walz brought suit in a New York court arguing that
the exemption of church-owned property in the City had the effect of raising his taxes
and forcing him to contribute to an establishment of religion.
Id
73. 397 U.S. at 664.
74. Id at 669.
75. Id.
76. Id at 667 n. I. Members of this broad class included corporations or associations
organized exclusively for charitable, educational, scientific, medical, patriotic, historic, literary,
or library purposes.
77. A tax exemption was not the same as a direct grant, even though it conferred some
economic benefit. Chief Justice Burger wrote:
The grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship since the government does not transfer part of its revenue to churches but simply abstains from demanding that the
church support the state. No one has ever suggested that tax exemption has con-

the Court maintained taxation would produce entanglement
problems of church property valuation and forfeitures, which could
be construed as state hostility towards religion, while statutory tax
exemptions resulted in less state involvement with religion.
In Nyquist, New York legislated three types of aid,78 all held
unconstitutional under the establishment clause. The portion of the
case relevant to New Jersey's tax exemption discussed tax relief 19 for
parents of dependents in nonpublic schools, who could subtract a set
amount from their adjusted gross income for state income tax purposes. Eligible parents were those who paid at least fifty dollars in
nonpublic school tuition per dependent. As the parents income increased, the deduction decreased, until at a $25,000 income, no deduction was allowed.' A three judge district court upheld this form
of tax relief,8 but the Court, in an opinion by Justice Powell, declared that the plan had the impermissible primary effect of advancing religion.
Justice Powell distinguished the property tax exemptions of
Walz from the parental exemptions of Nyquist. Unlike church property exemptions, parental tax relief did not have a long history of
acceptance.8 2 The Walz exemptions protected religious institutions
from possible hostile state action. Church property exemptions were
dictated by the free exercise clause in addition to the establishment
clause in order that government neutrality towards religion could be
maintained. "Special tax benefits, however, cannot be squared with
the principle of neutrality established by the decisions of this Court.
To the contrary, insofar as such benefits render assistance to parents
who send their children to sectarian schools, their purpose and inevitable effect are to aid and advance religious institutions." 3 Tax
credits were comparable to tuition reimbursements. The difference
between a parent actually receiving cash and a reduction in his taxes
verted libraries, art galleries, or hospitals into arms of the state or put employee "on
the public payroll."
397 U.S. at 675.
78. The three types of aid included first, direct grants to nonpublic schools in low income areas for maintenance and repair, second, tuition reimbursement grants for low income
parents of children in nonpublic schools; and third, income tax relief for parents earning less
than $25,000 per year but more than $5,000 per year.
79. The parties in Nyqzdsl could not come to terms on what label to pin on the tax relief.
In form it was a tax deduction, but in practice it was a tax credit since the amount deducted
was not related to the amount spent on tuition. The Court did not need to label the aid to
strike it down and reserved the question of whether a "genuine tax deduction" would satisfy
the criteria of Walk. 413 U.S. at 790 n49.
80. Id at 764-65.
81. 350 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
82. Cf. Waiz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 703 (1970) (Douglas, J_ dissenting). Justice
Douglas rejected the historical validity argument He asserted that tax exemption of church
property arose in the early days of the United States when the church was an agent of the state,
thus making the exemption suspect.
83. 413 U.S. at 793 (emphasis added).

by a statutory amount was illusory- "In both instances the money
involved represents a charge made upon the state for the purpose of
religious education."'
The three dissenting Justices 5 retained the Walz distinction between tax subsidies and tax exemptions 6 and denied that aid to parents, rather than to church schools, directly advanced religion. The
tax relief would only incidentally aid religion. The primary effect of
the statute would be fulfillment of New York's secular goal of equalizing the costs of educating New York children that are borne by
parents who send their children to nonpublic schools.87 The majority, however, considered aid to parents instead of directly to schools
merely one of many factors to weigh in the balance.88
In Public FundsforPublicSchools of New Jersey v. Byrne, New
Jersey hoped to circumvent the fate of New York's tax relief by giving a standard $1,000 deduction instead of the sliding scale amounts
dependent on income in Nyquit, to a broader class of taxpayers.8 9
The court of appeals, however, was not impressed with the "class of
taxpayers likely to have added expenses."'
The court concluded
that the class did not reach acceptable Walz proportions. Public
school parents were denied the benefit of an additional exemption.
New Jersey did include parents of public school dependents on a
college level, but the court maintained that provision did not correct
the disparity of treatment on the lower levels of education. The underinclusiveness of the benefited class placed New Jersey's tax
scheme on par with the plan in Nyquis, and in the court's opinion,
prevented the statute from classification as a true tax deduction.9 '
Public Funds/orPublic Schools of New Jersey v. Byrne is not a
landmark case in the sense of.beginning or ending a trend. The aid
to nonpublic school question still remains open. The possibility for
judicial acceptance of renewed legislative effort in this area continues if the class of eligible beneficiaries is broadened and if the tax
relief meets the standards of a true tax deduction. New Jersey's tax
84. Id at 793 (quoting Committee For Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 350 F. Supp. 655, 675
(S.D.N.Y. 1972)).
85. Chief Justice Burger, Justice Rehnquist, and Justice White filed dissenting opinions
that would have upheld the tax relief on free exercise and neutrality grounds.
86. See note 77 supra
87. 413 U.S. at 812.
88. See Piekarski, supra note 39, at 258. "The Court made it clear that the existence of a
conduit is unimportant if the nature of the ultimate beneficiary is "permeated" with religion by
striking down the second and third parts of the New York plan." Id
89. See Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer, 452 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Minn. 1978).
A Minnesota statute allowing both parents of public and parents of nonpublic school students
to claim up to $700 as a deduction in light of expenses incurred from educating their children
was upheld- The court stated that inclusion of public school students' parents made the statute
neutral, it did not advance religion. The court also decided the statute was a true tax deduction.
90. 590 F.2d at 519.
91. Id at 520 n.il.

relief also demonstrates the persistent search by the states for means
of aiding the nonpublic school system. Despite one commentator's
remark 92 that Nyquist nailed the coffin shut on tax relief to nonpublic school parents, New Jersey and other states93 have devised programs similar to that in Nyquist but with subtle differences, hoping
to avoid establishment clause challenges.
Recent cases have concentrated on the establishment clause and
paid little attention to the free exercise clause or the concept of neutrality. Future tax relief statutes could be sustained if they applied to
a broad base of recipients, were directed to the students or parents
94
instead of the institution, and remained neutral towards religion.
The Court has not closed the door on aid to sectarian schools, and as
the end of the twentieth century nears, the Court may be willing to
balance the contributions of nonpublic schools to society against the
diminishing danger of religious division immobilizing society. 95

92. Young, supra note 21, at 792.
93. California, Ohio, and Minnesota all had similar tax programs invalidated on the
strength of Nyquist. See Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer, 452 F. Supp. 1316, 132021 (D. Minn. 1978) (differentiates valid tax deduction from tax relief sponsored by other
states).
94. See Young, supra note 21, at 805.
95. Id at 803.
[Casenote by Jean M. Murphy]

